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Résumé : Parmi les arguments contre la possibilité d’une distinction de
principe entre le factuel et le conventionnel, l’un des plus suivis affirme que,
parce qu’on ne peut évaluer ses convictions que collectivement, on peut soutenir
n’importe quel énoncé face à n’importe quelle expérience. Cet article pro-
pose d’établir que cet argument ne peut pas ébranler le conventionnalisme de
Poincaré, étant donné que sa doctrine ne se réduit pas à l’affirmation qu’il y a
des principes immunisés contre la révision. On soutiendra que le point le plus
important de la compréhension de la structure de la connaissance théorique
par Poincaré réside dans le fait que certains principes ne peuvent pas être
testés expérimentalement parce que ce sont les principes mêmes qui permet-
tent l’application des termes théoriques à l’expérience.
Abstract: One of the most influential arguments against the possibility of
drawing a principled fact-convention distinction consists in the insight that
because our beliefs are necessarily evaluated together, any statement can be
retained or given up in the face of experience. The purpose of this paper is to
establish that this argument does not undermine Poincaré’s conventionalism
in virtue of the fact that this doctrine does not simply amount to the claim
that there are principles that are immune to revision. It will be argued that
Poincaré’s most important insight into the structure of theoretical knowledge
is that there exist principles that cannot be empirically tested because they
make possible the application of theoretical terms to experience.
The most influential argument against the possibility of a priori princi-
ples to come out of the twentieth century stems from the insight that “our
statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience not
individually but only as a corporate body” [Quine 1961, 41]. This is the doc-
trine of epistemological holism and it has been argued that if it is true, then
any statement can be made immune from revision, and at the same time, no
statement is beyond getting revised, should we find it pragmatically advan-
tageous to do so. Consequently, the argument goes, the distinction between
empirical and a priori claims, or factual and conventional statements, will be
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at best arbitrary (given the first insight), and at worst non-existent (given the
second). This argument has been used by Quine to attack the dogma of ana-
lyticity and, more recently, by Devitt to undermine the possibility of a priori
knowledge (see [Quine 1961], [Devitt 1998], and [Devitt 2005]). It was used
earlier by Duhem to attack Poincaré’s doctrine of conventionalism. The pur-
pose of this paper is to show that the argument from epistemological holism
fails to undermine Poincaré’s conventionalism.
Duhem, like many of Poincaré’s self-professed successors 1, understands
conventions as principles that are “incapable of being refuted by experiment”
[Duhem 1906, 208]. The axioms of Euclidean geometry constitute one such
set of conventions because they cannot be disconfirmed by such experiments
as the measurement of stellar parallaxes. Poincaré maintains that should
we discover negative parallaxes, we could either abandon Euclidean geome-
try or reject the assumption that light travels in straight lines. And since
Euclidean geometry will always be preferable to its non-Euclidean alterna-
tives, Poincaré concludes that it “has nothing to fear from fresh experiments”
[Poincaré 1902, 73].
Duhem concedes that there are statements that are not straightforwardly
verifiable or falsifiable, but he denies that they lack “experimental meaning”.
The principle of inertia is one such hypothesis and is explicitly identified by
Poincaré as having the status of a convention. Duhem maintains that it is
supposed to have this status because the motions of bodies cannot be deter-
mined without first identifying a frame of reference, and we will always be in a
position to select a frame in which the law of inertia holds [Duhem 1906, 213].
He points out, though, that the laws of motion are not unique in this regard.
In fact, Duhem maintains that any principle in the mathematical sciences can
be insulated from experimental disconfirmation. He says, for example, that
“no chemical analysis, no matter how refined, will ever be able to show the
law of multiple proportions to be wrong” [Duhem 1906, 214], because we will
always be free to change our initial assumptions about the relative masses
of the constituents of the compounds involved in a chemical reaction. If the
distinguishing feature of conventions is that they are insensitive to empirical
facts, and yet any statement can be maintained in the face of experience, then
the distinction between conventions and factual statements is arbitrary.
Furthermore, from the fact that these principles do not admit of decisive
experimental tests, it does not follow that empirical evidence cannot compel
us to revise them. The laws of motion and the law of multiple proportions
constitute the foundations of Newtonian mechanics and modern chemistry,
respectively. And though these theories have proven remarkably effective in
predicting and explaining certain features of our experience, there may come a
day when we are best served to abandon them—indeed, such a day has come
1. See [Neurath, Hahn, & Carnap 1929, 312], [Schlick 1915, 168–169], [Carnap
1995, 144–145].
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and gone in the case of Newtonian mechanics. Foundational hypotheses, then,
are only as good as the theories that they make possible, and should these
theories come into conflict with experience, their presuppositions will have
been refuted by experiment, albeit indirectly. Thus, no statement is immune
to revision, and so the distinction between factual and conventional statements
is non-existent.
Duhem’s objection to Poincaré’s conventionalism crucially relies on his
characterization of conventions as principles that we choose to insulate from
empirical disconfirmation. It will be argued, however, that this characteri-
zation is overly simplistic and misleading; to properly understand Poincaré’s
conventionalism, we must differentiate between the principles that must be
invoked to apply our theoretical concepts to experience—we will call these
constitutive principles—and the principles that we are free to invoke in ap-
plying our concepts to experience—we will call these conventions. The former
are implicitly and necessarily presupposed in our measurement of theoretical
quantities, even though we do not always realize that this is the case, while the
latter we choose to elevate to the status of conventions. This explains why,
in his philosophical writings on geometry, mechanics, and electrodynamics,
Poincaré insists on the definitional status of certain principles while recogniz-
ing that the epistemological status of other principles will be determined by
considerations of expedience. Thus, while Poincaré will readily admit that an
exhaustive distinction between factual and conventional statements cannot be
made on anything other than pragmatic grounds, he will deny that any state-
ment can play the interpretive role of a constitutive principle, as Duhem’s
objection supposes. Finally, it will be argued that while Poincaré had thought
that constitutive principles cannot be revised, his insights into their definitional
character nevertheless provide some of the resources necessary to differentiate
their revision from changes in our empirical beliefs.
1 Interpretations of Poincaré’s conven-
tionalism
Several readers have interpreted Poincaré’s conventionalism in much the
way that Duhem does. 2 Friedman, however, presents a reconstruction of
Poincaré’s conventionalism with the express purpose of differentiating it from
the epistemological holism of Duhem and Quine, thereby avoiding their argu-
ment against the possibility of drawing a non-arbitrary fact-convention distinc-
tion. The key to understanding Poincaré’s conventionalism, Friedman thinks,
2. See, for example, [Giedymin 1982], [Giedymin 1991], [Gillies 1993, Chapter 4],
[Ben-Menahem 2001], [Ben-Menahem 2006, Chapter 2]. Only Giedymin provides a
response to the argument from epistemological holism.
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is to appreciate his view that the exact sciences sit in a hierarchical order of
dependence: The theory of mathematical magnitude presupposes arithmetic,
geometry presupposes the theory of mathematical magnitude, the laws of mo-
tion presuppose geometry, and the empirical laws of physics presuppose the
laws of motion. The laws of motion cannot be tested empirically because they
define the concepts of motion, force, and mass that we must take for granted
in any such experimental test. The situation is somewhat more complicated
in the case of geometry. For Poincaré, geometry is the study of the free dis-
placements of rigid bodies (see § 2 below). These motions, he finds, constitute
a six-dimensional Lie group; the Helmholtz-Lie theorem establishes that the
existence of such a group implies that space must possess a constant curva-
ture, but it does not specify that the curvature be positive (in the case of
Riemannian geometry), negative (in the case of Bolyai-Lobachevsky geome-
try), or null (in the case of Euclidean geometry). Experiment cannot make
this determination either, for we are not actually acquainted with rigid bodies,
since all bodies are subject to physical forces. Friedman concludes:
It is therefore completely impossible simply to read off, as it were,
geometry from the behavior of actual bodies without first formu-
lating theories about physical forces. [. . . ] And it now follows
that geometry cannot depend on the behavior of actual bodies.
For, according to the above-described hierarchy of sciences, the
determination of particular physical forces presupposes the laws
of motion, and the laws of motion in turn presuppose geometry
itself: one must first set up a geometry before one can establish a
particular theory of physical forces. [Friedman 1999, 78]
The principles of geometry, like the laws of motion, are not subject to em-
pirical tests because such a test will take place within a science—empirical
physics—that necessarily presupposes the laws of motion, and thus, the prin-
ciples of geometry. These principles are not statements that we choose to
regard as conventions, but definitions that must be in place before the testing
of empirical hypotheses can begin.
One of the appealing features of Friedman’s reconstruction of Poincaré’s
conventionalism is that it accounts for the conventionality of the principles of
geometry and the basic laws of physics. Nevertheless, it seems to me that
Euclidean geometry and the laws of motion are not conventional in the same
sense for Poincaré. Friedman’s account of the conventional status of the laws
of motion is quite in order. He says, with regard to Poincaré’s argument:
I understand him here to be arguing that the fundamental con-
cepts of time, motion, mass, and force have no determinate em-
pirical meaning independently of the laws of mechanics. Thus, for
example, the laws of motion supply us with an implicit definition
of the inertial frames of reference, without which no empirically
applicable concept of time or motion is possible; the concepts
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of mass and force are only empirically applicable on the basis
of the second and third Newtonian laws of motion; and so on.
[Friedman 1999, 76]
The laws of motion function as ‘definitions in disguise’ insofar as they provide
us with the conditions thatmust be met if force and mass are to be measurable,
i.e., empirically applicable, quantities. Their definitional status is due to what
Friedman elsewhere calls their constitutive role within our physical theory
[Friedman 2002]. A principle p is a constitutive condition of a set of theoretical
statements T , when one or more of the terms in T ismeaningless in the absence
of p. Without the laws of motion, the principles of mechanics, such as the law
of universal gravitation, would fail to make empirical sense.
Poincaré does not present the same sort of argument for his geometrical
conventionalism. The postulates of Euclidean geometry do not express the
conditions that must be met if size and distance are to be measurable quanti-
ties; these are expressed by the principle of free mobility, which is compatible
with all three geometries of constant curvature. Instead, the conventional sta-
tus of the principles of geometry is due to our freedom to choose which objects
remain practically rigid during spatial transport. This freedom is guaranteed
not in virtue of the fact that the laws of motion must take for granted a set of
geometrical principles, but by the fact that one and the same observable state
of affairs will always be describable using either Euclidean geometry together
with a set of physical laws or Lobachevskian geometry together with a very
different set of laws. This is precisely the point of Poincaré’s scenario of a
closed spherical world in which the temperature at every point is proportional
to R2−r2, where R is the radius of the sphere and r is the distance of the point
from the center of the sphere, and in which the size of all bodies also varies
in accordance with this law [Poincaré 1902, 65–68]. 3 From our Euclidean per-
spective, the inhabitants of this world and their measuring instruments shrink
as they approach the boundary of the sphere. From their perspective, they
live in an infinite Lobachevskian world in which bodies are displaced without
being deformed. Since these amount to observationally equivalent descriptions
of the same set of facts, we are free to use either notion of rigidity.
The key to understanding Poincaré’s conventionalism, as I will argue be-
low, is not to be found in the hierarchical ordering of the sciences, but in the
hierarchical ordering of principles within the sciences. 4 Geometry must take
for granted notions of shape and size, as they are defined by the principle of free
mobility. Once we have adopted a geometry that is compatible with the con-
dition of free mobility, we can then make particular empirical determinations
of the sizes and shapes of the figures presented to us in experience. We are
3. He also supposes that in this world light travels through media whose indices
of refraction are inversely proportional to R2 − r2.
4. Illuminating work on Poincaré’s typology of hypotheses can be found in
[Heinzmann 2008], [Walter 2008], and [Walter 2010].
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free to adopt a non-Euclidean geometry for this purpose, but from Poincaré’s
perspective, considerations of simplicity will prevent us from actually doing so.
In brief, certain empirical results must be understood against the background
of pragmatically constrained conventions, which, in turn, must presuppose the
constitutive principles that make it possible to apply our theoretical concepts
to experience. As we shall see, this schema of principles is discernible not only
in Poincaré’s work on geometry, but also in his writings on mechanics and elec-
trodynamics. Moreover, it will be argued that Duhem’s failure to appreciate
this subtle distinction undermines his argument from epistemological holism.
2 Conventions in geometry
According to Poincaré, the principle of free mobility is essential to our
knowledge of space in three respects. First, it is indispensable to the genesis
of our understanding of space; Poincaré maintains that at an early age we
learn to distinguish spatial displacements from other kinds of alterations in
our perceptual field by classifying the former as changes that can be undone
by a suitable reorientation of our bodies. This capacity of ours, however,
depends on the presupposition that bodies can be displaced without thereby
undergoing a deformation. Second, the constructive proof procedures used in
synthetic geometry necessarily take for granted the principle of free mobility.
In synthetic geometry, two figures are equal when we can superpose one on
the other, but
This assumes that they can be displaced and also that, among all
the changes which they may undergo, we can distinguish those
which may be regarded as displacements without deformation.
[Poincaré 1898, 32]
Without this presupposition we would lack well defined notions of the shape
and size of geometrical constructions [Poincaré 1898, 33]. Finally, when we
measure the shape and size of physical bodies, we presuppose that our mea-
suring instruments are not deformed when transported from one place to an-
other. Thus, the principle of free mobility makes possible the application of
our geometrical concepts to physical objects.
The distinctive status of the principle of free mobility is not the result of
our choosing to hold it true “come what may”, but instead, is due to its consti-
tutive function within the science of space. It is this constitutive function that
Poincaré has in mind when he argues against Russell that the principle ex-
presses a disguised definition of shape rather than a factual claim about some-
thing with which we are antecedently familiar. 5 Russell maintains that ‘shape’
5. For an illuminating discussion of the debate between Russell and Poincaré on
this topic, see [Coffa 1986, § 2].
. . . Poincaré’s Conventionalism 53
is an indefinable term whose meaning must be immediately apprehended in
intuition. The principle of free mobility, accordingly, is not a definition, but
an a priori truth whose justification is secured by particular features of our
intuition of bodies in space. Our intuitive notion of shape, however, relies on
our ability to view a figure from different perspectives, and so, takes it for
granted that our bodies can move freely through space. Moreover, Poincaré
argues that these intuitions tell us nothing about how to actually determine
the shape and size of geometrical figures. The principle of free mobility, on
the other hand, plays a crucial role in making such determinations possible;
the way we determine that two or more figures have the same shape and size
is by bringing them into congruence. When doing so, we assume that their
spatial dimensions do not change. Therefore, shape cannot be defined inde-
pendently of the principle of free mobility, and so this principle has the status
of a definition rather than an a priori truth [Poincaré 1902, 44–45].
The principle of free mobility, however, does not tell us which bodies remain
rigid during spatial transport. This is because, as we have seen, Euclidean and
Lobachevskian geometries constitute observationally equivalent descriptions of
the same set of facts. We are free to choose either one of them as determining
what will count as a rigid body and a straight line. 6 And because Euclidean
geometry is the simplest candidate, we stipulate that rigid bodies and straight
lines will behave in our world the way that Euclidean geometry says they
do. This conventional choice, though, ought to be distinguished from the
constitutive principle that makes this choice possible, namely, the principle of
free mobility. The principle of free mobility is not stipulated at the outset,
but is implicitly presupposed in our measurements of geometrical figures.
3 Conventions in mechanics
Just as the principle of free mobility is constitutive of our notion of space,
Poincaré maintains that the laws of motion are constitutive of our notions of
force and mass. If we are to empirically test the second law of motion, says
Poincaré, “we have to measure the three magnitudes mentioned in the enun-
ciation: acceleration, force, and mass” [Poincaré 1902, 97]. More specifically,
we must be able to measure force, mass, and acceleration without appealing
to Newton’s second law. Poincaré admits that we can detect and measure
acceleration independently of the second law of motion, provided we have a
reliable means of measuring time. Forces, on the other hand, are not the
kinds of things that can be directly observed. Nevertheless, we may indeed be
tempted, as was Russell with regard to the principle of free mobility, to claim
that the second law of motion captures some independently discernible fact
6. Alternatively, we may designate certain physical entities as rigid bodies and
straight lines and determine the geometry empirically.
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about our intuitive understanding of force. However, Poincaré insists that any
such primitive understanding of force as, for example, the muscular exertion
needed to displace an object, is an “insufficient basis for mechanics”, because
it does not tell us how force is to be measured [Poincaré 1902, 106]. The
second law of motion, on the other hand, tells us exactly how to detect and
measure forces: we do so by measuring their observable effects on physical
bodies, namely, their tendency to alter a body’s state of motion. Since we
cannot define force independently of the second law of motion,
We are therefore reduced to Kirchoff’s definition: force is the
product of the mass and the acceleration. This law of Newton in
its turn ceases to be regarded as an experimental law, it is now
only a definition. [Poincaré 1902, 100]
Using this definition, as it stands, we can measure two forces when applied
at different times to one and the same body, but it does not permit us to
measure the action of two forces when applied to distinct bodies until we
have a way of determining the masses of those bodies. We must do this by
assigning to each body within the system under consideration a mass such
that the motion of the system’s center of gravity is uniform and rectilinear.
Poincaré insists that:
This will always be possible if Newton’s third law holds good, and
it will be in general possible only in one way. [Poincaré 1902, 103]
Once again, we see one of Newton’s laws functioning as a definition, this time
of ‘mass’, rather than an empirical or a priori truth. Things are not so simple,
however:
But no system exists which is abstracted from all external ac-
tion; every part of the universe is subject, more or less, to the
action of the other parts. The law of the motion of the centre of
gravity is only rigorously true when applied to the whole universe.
[Poincaré 1902]
If we are to rigorously define mass, then we must be able to locate the universe’s
center of gravity. Since this task is impossible, we must settle for the definition:
Masses are co-efficients which it is found convenient to introduce
into calculations. [Poincaré 1902]
Poincaré adds that:
We could reconstruct our mechanics by giving to our masses dif-
ferent values [than the values we currently give them] . . . But the
equations of this mechanics would not be so simple. [Poincaré
1902, 103–104]
The situation in mechanics closely resembles Poincaré’s assessment of the
situation in geometry. The laws of motion, like the principle of free mobility,
function as constitutive principles which implicitly define the terms ‘force’ and
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‘mass’, thus making it possible to solve Newton’s “basic problem of philoso-
phy [which] seems to be to discover the forces of nature from the phenomena
of motions and then to demonstrate the other phenomena from these forces”
[Newton 1726, 382]. However, just as the principle of free mobility is com-
patible with any geometry of constant curvature, and thus fails to single out
any one of them as constituting the correct description of space, the “general
principles of mechanics” (the constitutive principles) do not uniquely fix the
“equations of mechanics” (the empirical laws relating to particular forces and
masses), and so there is a certain measure of choice involved in our dynamical
description of the forces and masses at work in the universe [Poincaré 1902,
104]. The assignment of masses to a dynamically interacting system of bodies
will be constrained by empirical evidence regarding the accelerations of the
bodies, but these constraints are not strong enough to single out a unique
assignment of masses as being correct.
4 Conventions and the measurement of time
Like the case of force, we have an intuitive notion of the passage of time;
there is a clear intuitive sense in which our experiences occur in a temporal
sequence, and that two experiences can happen simultaneously. It is not at
all clear, though, that our experience of the passage of time coincides with
the experiences of others, nor that we can use these experiences to objectively
measure time. In fact, Poincaré maintains that:
We have not a direct intuition of the equality of two intervals of
time. [Poincaré 1905, 27]
Rather than appeal to their intuition, physicists use pendulums to measure
duration by supposing that each beat takes the same amount of time. There
are, however, various disturbing influences on the pendulum (temperature, air-
resistance, barometric pressure, etc.) which compel us to correct the time it
measures. We do so by comparing it with yet another standard: the sidereal
day. Physicists suppose, though, that the tides act as a perturbing influence
on the rotation of the earth, which explains the apparent acceleration of the
moon, and as such, even this standard must be corrected. What these facts
about our measurement of time intervals tell us is not that there is an absolute
time in which all physical events occur, but that our means of measuring
time presuppose an ideal that we can approximate only roughly. This ideal
is determined by the principle that is presupposed in every measurement of
temporal intervals:
When we use the pendulum to measure time, what postulate do
we implicitly admit? It is that the duration of two identical phe-
nomena is the same; or, if you prefer, that the same causes take
the same time to produce the same effects. [Poincaré 1905, 28]
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This is the principle independently of which we cannot make sense of our
notion of time. The problem with actually applying this postulate is that
physical phenomena are not causally isolated; what seem like two instances
of the same phenomenon—say, two swings of a pendulum—actually involve
countless perturbing influences. Therefore, we must invoke physical principles
to correct our standards of measurement. The law of the conservation of
momentum suggests that the rotation of the earth is a physical process that
can be used to reliably measure time intervals. When measuring temporal
intervals using sidereal days, however, we must take into account the heat
produced by the friction of the tides to explain the secular acceleration of
the moon. In this case, the law of the conservation of energy and the law of
universal gravitation are being used to correct our standard of measurement.
There is nothing preventing us from treating our standard as precisely true
and altering our physical laws, except that this course of action would make
the science of mechanics overly cumbersome:
So that the definition implicitly adopted by the astronomers may
be summed up thus: time should be so defined that the equa-
tions of mechanics may be as simple as possible. In other words,
there is not one way of measuring time more true than an-
other; that which is generally adopted is only more convenient.
[Poincaré 1905, 30] 7
There are two kinds of conventions that make possible the measurement of
temporal intervals: First, the definition that the same causes take the same
time to produce the same effects, and second, our decision to apply this def-
inition such that our physics is made as simple as possible. The latter sort
of convention is necessary because there are many observationally equivalent
ways of measuring time; but the very notion of a measure of time makes
sense only on the supposition that there exists a phenomenon that repeats
itself uniformly.
Determining the temporal sequence of some set of physical events requires
that we are able to determine which events occur simultaneously. Two psy-
chological events occur simultaneously, says Poincaré, when “. . . analysis can
not separate [them] without mutilating them” [Poincaré 1905, 31]. We can
and do use this as a criterion to determine the order of local physical events,
but of course it is not a definition of simultaneity that is applicable to distant
physical events. In order to arrive at a definition of simultaneity that is ap-
plicable to all physical events, Poincaré proposes “to understand the definition
implicitly supposed by the savants, let us watch them at work and look for
the rules by which they investigate simultaneity” [Poincaré 1905, 34]. So, for
7. Here it should be recalled that Poincaré uses the terms “equations of mechanics”
to designate empirical laws, and thus, they should not be confused with what he calls
the “general principles of mechanics”, which are the constitutive principles (the laws
of motion) that make these laws intelligible.
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example, what does an astronomer mean when he tells us that the light that
we see now was emitted from a star some time ago? Poincaré answers,
He has begun by supposing that light has a constant velocity, and
in particular that its velocity is the same in all directions. That is
a postulate without which no measurement of this velocity could
be attempted. [Poincaré 1905, 34]
In order to put celestial events into a temporal sequence, we must know how
far the light signals emitted from such events have to travel to reach us and we
must suppose that these signals have a constant velocity in all directions. If
we have the means to determine the distance between the earth and celestial
bodies, and we assume that the light signals emitted from every body travel
at the same speed, then we can determine the sequence of celestial events.
Furthermore, by combining this rule with the principles of mechanics, we can
determine how fast the light signals are traveling, and thus, how long ago
celestial events that we experience now took place. We could, for example,
determine the velocity of light by determining the lag between the observed
eclipses of the satellites of Jupiter and the Newtonian prediction of when these
events would take place. In doing so, of course, we would have to assume the
law of universal gravitation to be precisely true, but we are certainly not forced
to do so:
Could not the observed facts be just as well explained if we at-
tributed to the velocity of light a little different value from that
adopted, and supposed Newton’s law only approximate? Only
this would lead to replacing Newton’s law by another more com-
plicated [law]. So for the velocity of light a value is adopted, such
that the astronomic laws compatible with this value may be as
simple as possible. [Poincaré 1905, 35] 8
Once again, there are two different kinds of conventions at work in determining
when a distant event took place: first, the definition that light has a constant
velocity in all directions, and second, the decision to treat the law of universal
gravitation as being precisely true. The latter is chosen on the basis of its
pragmatic advantages over its observationally equivalent alternatives, the for-
mer is a constitutive principle that makes the temporal ordering of (distant)
physical events possible.
5 Constitutive principles and epistemologi-
cal holism
Duhem recognizes the need for definitions which confer “symbolic mean-
ings” on abstract theoretical terms by linking them with observable phenom-
8. Since Roemer attempted this calculation before the publication of Newton’s
Principia, one could make a similar remark about the status of Kepler’s laws.
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ena [Duhem 1906, 194]. In his view, however, the principles that serve this
function are no less empirical than other hypotheses within the mathemati-
cal sciences. For example, he explains that the expression ‘free falling heavy
body’ is given a symbolic meaning by the law of falling bodies. Nevertheless,
in the event that we are faced with a situation in which a seemingly unsup-
ported body does not fall with a constant acceleration, we may reject the law
of falling bodies and change our physics accordingly, or alternatively, we may
postulate the existence of unseen obstacles that hindered the fall of the ob-
ject in question, such as air resistance. The latter option will almost always
be preferable since “taking the first alternative we should be obliged to de-
stroy from top to bottom a very vast theoretical system which represents in
a most satisfactory manner a very extensive and complex set of experimen-
tal laws” [Duhem 1906, 211]. We are not, however, logically prevented from
taking the former course of action, and in fact there will be exceptional cir-
cumstances in which the revision of such definitions results in the genesis of a
revolutionary new theory. Thus, Duhem thinks that because of the underde-
termination of theory by observation, there is no principled distinction to be
drawn between definitions and empirical laws; any principle within the corpus
of our scientific knowledge is liable to be elevated to the status of a defini-
tion, while at the same time, any definition can be revised, should we find it
convenient to do so.
Poincaré recognizes that there are principles that can be treated either as
empirical laws or as definitions. He says, for example, that we may adopt the
attitude that the law of universal gravitation is an empirical law, or we can
elevate it to the status of a definition, and he adds:
The choice between the two attitudes is free, and is made from con-
siderations of convenience, though these considerations are most
often so strong that there remains practically little of this freedom.
[Poincaré 1905, 124]
As Duhem points out, we may adopt either one of these attitudes with respect
to any principle within the mathematical sciences.
This insight, however, does not succeed in establishing that Poincaré’s fact-
convention distinction is unavoidably arbitrary. Constitutive principles are
unrevisable not because we have chosen to treat them as such, but in virtue
of their interpretive function of expressing the minimal theoretical structure
required to make empirical sense of the fundamental abstract terms of our the-
ories. Furthermore, Duhem fails to realize that constitutive principles cannot
be underdetermined by empirical evidence because evidence in the mathe-
matical sciences ultimately rests on the sorts of measurement results that are
made possible by such principles as the laws of motion and the principle of
free mobility. We are not free, as we are in the case of the law of falling
bodies or the universal law of gravitation, to regard these principles as defini-
tions or empirical laws; instead, their constitutive status is determined by the
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fact that they make certain kinds of empirical tests possible. Consequently,
the holist’s observation that “[a]ny statement can be held true come what
may, if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the system” [Quine
1961, 43]—an observation that Poincaré may well have endorsed—does not
motivate a move from Poincaré’s conventionalism to “a more thorough prag-
matism” [Quine 1961, 46], since it clearly does not follow from this observation
that any statement can be considered a constitutive principle.
6 The revision of constitutive principles
Poincaré’s insights into the constitutive character of certain physical princi-
ples clearly motivate his view of the stratified structure of scientific knowledge.
One of the aspects of this view, as we have just seen, is that the constitutive
component of scientific knowledge is immune to revision because it gives em-
pirical content to our theoretical concepts. This aspect of Poincaré’s view,
however, is challenged by the holist’s claim that “no statement is immune to
revision”, and definitively undermined by the course of physics in the twentieth
century; indeed, we know that the principles Poincaré identifies as being con-
stitutive are revisable because nearly all of them have been displaced by the
theories of relativity. 9 Nevertheless, the pertinence of these facts to Poincaré’s
conventionalism ought not to be overstated. Rather than being mistaken about
the distinction between empirical and constitutive principles, we might suspect
that Poincaré was mistaken in thinking that the interpretive function of the
latter makes them immune to revision. Making this case, though, puts us
in the position of having to rise to the naturalist’s challenge “to differentiate
revisions in the purportedly a priori claims from ordinary scientific progress”
[Maddy 2000, 114].
This challenge has been taken up recently by Friedman’s theory of the
relativized a priori. Like Poincaré, he claims that abstract scientific theo-
ries must be formulated and evaluated within a constitutive framework that
defines what is physically possible and what will count as evidence for and
against such theories [Friedman 2002, Part II, §§ 1–2]. This being the case,
Friedman says:
Our problem, then, is to explain how a revolutionary transition
from one scientific paradigm or constitutive framework to another
can be communicatively rational, despite the fact that we are in
this case faced with two essentially different and even incommen-
surable “logical spaces”. [Friedman 2002, 95]
His answer is that it is at the meta-scientific level of philosophical reflec-
tion that we first encounter reasons to take new constitutive frameworks se-
9. The only one that remains is his definition of simultaneity.
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riously. So, for example, while the special theory of relativity fails to en-
gage classical mechanics on its own terms, it does constitute a contribution to
the ongoing philosophical debates concerning absolute versus relative motion
and the status of theoretical principles. Friedman maintains that Einstein’s
main philosophical insight was to raise the relativity and light principles to
the status of “postulates”, and it is in precisely this move that he sees the
influence of Poincaré:
Einstein proceeded here, in perfect conformity with Poincaré’s
underlying philosophy in Science and Hypothesis, by “elevating”
an already established empirical fact into the radically new status
of what Poincaré calls a “definition in disguise”—namely, what we
call a coordinating principle. [Friedman 2002, 111]
By elevating the relativity principle and the light principle to the status of
postulates, Einstein produces an entirely novel theory of space and time, or
rather space-time, in which the laws of electrodynamics, rather than those of
mechanics, play the role of a constitutive framework. And while the classi-
cal physicist and the proponent of special relativity are essentially speaking
different languages—they will measure length and time differently, and thus
the terms ‘length’ and ‘time’ have entirely distinct meanings for these two
physicists—the classical physicist cannot ignore Einstein’s theory as nonsense
because it engages contemporary philosophical concerns about space and time,
and the status of fundamental theoretical principles.
Friedman’s account of the rationality of revolutionary theory change and
his account of Poincaré’s role in the genesis and acceptance of special relativ-
ity conflicts with the view of Poincaré’s conventionalism outlined above. It
has been argued that constitutive principles—the sorts of principles that were
revised in the move from classical mechanics to special relativity—are not ele-
vated to the status of ‘definitions in disguise’ but implicitly presupposed in our
measurement of theoretical magnitudes. It must be admitted, however, that
when faced with Einstein’s kinematical interpretation of the Lorentz symme-
try, Poincaré himself says:
Today some physicists want to adopt a new convention. It is
not that they are constrained to do so; they consider this new
convention more convenient; that is all. [Poincaré 1913, 24]
These remarks seem to constitute an admission on Poincaré’s behalf that the
fundamental principles of Newtonian physics do not in fact have the consti-
tutive status that he had taken them to have, since he now thinks that they
have been adopted, and may be revised, on pragmatic grounds. Indeed, it is
now difficult to see in what respects Poincaré differs from Duhem, who ac-
knowledges that we grant to certain principles the status of definitions with
the understanding that in the future it may make “good sense” to give them
up. If this conclusion is to be avoided, and the present view of Poincaré’s
conventionalism is to be sustained, there must be an alternative account of
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the revision of constitutive principles that is sensitive to their intrinsically in-
terpretive character. The remainder of this paper will be dedicated to showing
that such an account of Einstein’s analysis of simultaneity can be defended,
and in fact, is quite plausible. 10
Despite his talk of raising the light principle to the status of a postulate,
what Einstein actually shows is that the light principle cannot be empirically
tested, and therefore, cannot be considered an empirical law. In order to
measure the speed of light, one must already be able to construct an inertial
frame of reference, i. e. a frame in which departures from inertial motion can
be accounted for by the presence of forces. Although, as Einstein points out:
If we wish to describe the motion of a material point, we give
the values of its co-ordinates as functions of the time. Now we
must bear carefully in mind that a mathematical description of
this kind has no physical meaning unless we are quite clear as to
what we understand by “time”. [Einstein 1905, 39]
If the light principle plays an essential role in the construction of inertial
frames, then any experiment designed to test this principle will necessarily
be circular. Consequently, Einstein’s view that the light postulate functions
as a constitutive principle rests on its indispensability to our spatio-temporal
framework. Einstein’s argument that this is indeed the case rests on his anal-
ysis of simultaneity.
Einstein maintains that:
We have to take into account that all our judgments in which
time plays a part are always judgments of simultaneous events.
[Einstein 1905, 39]
Consequently, if we are going to become clear on what we understand by
“time”, we must also be clear on what we understand by “simultaneous events”.
Here Einstein is not looking to stipulate a new definition of simultaneity, but
like Poincaré, to “understand the definition [of simultaneity] supposed by the
savants” [Poincaré 1905, 34]. When making judgements about the sequence of
local events, savants and laymen alike use the same criterion of simultaneity:
two (local) events are simultaneous when they are seen at the same time, i. e.,
when light signals emitted from those events are perceived at the same time.
This is not a suitable criterion for determining sequences of distant events, but
Poincaré and Einstein recognize that here too light signals are used:
We have not defined a common “time” for [observers] A and B, for
the latter cannot be defined at all unless we establish by definition
that the “time” required by light to travel from A to B equals the
“time” it requires to travel from B to A. [Einstein 1905, 40]
10. The remainder of this section is heavily indebted to [DiSalle 2006, Chapter 4.2].
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Like Poincaré, however, we may think of this as being a definition of “local
time” and that the true sequence of events can be determined only by the
use of infinitely fast signals (gravitational signals, perhaps). The true order of
events can be reconstructed on the basis of the local procedure, but this will
involve appealing to the velocity addition law to determine the time it takes
for light to travel from the events to the observer. This process is undermined
if, as it would seem, light does not obey the classical velocity addition law.
In this case, Einstein’s definition can no longer be regarded as a provisional
substitute for an invariant criterion; it is, in fact, itself an invariant criterion
since it has the unique advantage of being “independent of the standpoint of
the observer” [Einstein 1905, 39]. As a result, we see that the light principle is
indeed essential to our spatio-temporal framework, and for this reason, cannot
be considered an empirical law.
Poincaré had thought of constitutive principles as being unrevisable, and
when, in the face of special relativity, it became obvious that this is not the
case, he offers an account of the choice between alternative spatio-temporal
frameworks that effectively collapses the important distinction between consti-
tutive principles and conventions. What Einstein’s treatment of simultaneity
reveals, however, is that the move from one constitutive framework to another
is not happily seen as a choice between two incommensurable languages or
paradigms. Instead, constitutive principles are revised on the basis of concep-
tual analyses that uncover the assumptions that make the empirical application
of our theoretical concepts possible. Einstein’s argument begins with a crite-
rion of simultaneity that both he and his opponents (Poincaré and Lorentz)
accept, at least provisionally. The crucial move is then made when he shows
that, using this criterion, we cannot reconstruct an objective temporal order-
ing of events, and yet as far as we know, this is the only available criterion
that is independent of the position and velocity of the observer, and consistent
with well established physical laws.
Consequently, what Einstein has shown is not that the light principle can
be elevated from an empirical law to the status of convention, thereby giving us
a radically new definition of simultaneity, but that it was a mistake to regard
the light principle as being an empirical law in the first place, for it plays an
indispensable role in the construction of a spatio-temporal framework in which
empirical laws make sense. Poincaré was sufficiently radical as a philosopher
to see how such an analysis is capable of establishing the constitutive status
of certain principles, as in the case of the principle of free mobility, but in-
sufficiently radical as a mathematical physicist to see how such an analysis is
capable of revealing new constitutive principles.
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Conclusion
Poincaré’s contributions to axiomatics, group theory, and geometry sug-
gested to him that there is an important distinction to be made between the
structure and content of mathematical theories. It was natural, therefore, for
him to question how these two components relate to one another; in particu-
lar, Poincaré was concerned with how theories about such abstract entities as
space, time, and force could have anything to do with experience. He had no
doubt, of course, that we experience bodies in space and time, and under the
influence of forces, but these experiences by themselves have little bearing on
our scientific theories because they do not tell us how the quantities in question
are to be measured. Our observations become theoretically informative, he ar-
gues, only when we presuppose certain constitutive principles which link our
abstract concepts to experience. The conventional status of these principles
is due not to their being stipulated, arbitrary, or immune to revision, but to
their role as definitions rather than empirical claims containing antecedently
defined terms. These definitions make the measurement of the quantities des-
ignated by our basic theoretical terms possible, though they do not specify
precisely how they are to be measured; this is accomplished by a further sort
of convention which we choose to hold true in the face of empirical evidence.
The epistemological naturalist’s observations that any statement can be insu-
lated from empirical disconfirmation, and yet no statement is beyond getting
revised when it makes good sense to do so, thus do not impugn Poincaré’s
conventionalism because her characterization of a convention as a statement
that is insensitive to empirical evidence fails to capture the interpretive role
that these principles play in turning observations into evidence. 11
Bibliography
Ben-Menahem, Yemima
2001 Convention: Poincaré and some of his critics, British Journal for
the Philosophy of Science, 52, 471–513.
2006 Conventionalism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Carnap, Rudolf
1995 An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, New York: Dover.
Coffa, J., Alberto
1986 From geometry to tolerance: Sources of conventionalism in
nineteenth-century geometry, in From Quarks to Quasars, University
11. I owe a significant debt to Robert DiSalle for his generous and insightful guid-
ance, advice, and comments. I would also like to thank Aaron Barth, Sona Ghosh,
Kathleen Okruhlik, and Christopher Smeenk for their comments on earlier drafts.
64 Steven Bland
of Pittsburgh Studies in the Philosophy of Science, edited by
Colodny, R., Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 3–70.
Devitt, Michael
1998 Naturalism and the a priori, Philosophical Studies, 92, 45–65.
2005 There is no a priori, in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology,
Oxford: Blackwell, 105–114.
DiSalle, Robert
2006 Understanding Space-time, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Duhem, Pierre
1906 La Théorie physique; son objet, sa structure, Paris: Chevalier et
Rivière, 2nd ed., translated by P. Wiener as: The Aim and Structure
of Physical Theory, Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1954 .
Einstein, Albert
1905 On the electrodynamics of moving bodies, in The Principle of
Relativity, edited by A. Einstein, H. Minkowski, H.A. Lorentz
& Weyl, H., New York: Dover, 37–51, translated by W. Perrett and
G.B. Jeffrey, New York: Dover, 1952.
Friedman, Michael
1999 Reconsidering Logical Positivism, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, chap. Poincaré’s Conventionalism and the Logical
Positivists, 71–86.
2002 The Dynamics of Reason, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Giedymin, Jerzy
1982 Science and Convention: Essays on Henri Poincaré’s Philosophy
of Science and the Conventionalist Tradition, Oxford, New York:
Pergamon Press.
1991 Geometrical and Physical Conventionalism of Henri Poincaré in
Epistemological Formulation, Studies in History and Philosophy of
Science, 22(1), 1–22.
Gillies, Donald
1993 Philosophy of Science in the Twentieth Century, Oxford: Blackwell.
Heinzmann, Gerhard
2008 Hypotheses and conventions in Poincaré, in The Hypothetical in the
Natural Sciences, edited by Heidelberger, M. & Schiemann, G.,
Berlin: De Gruyter, 169–192.
. . . Poincaré’s Conventionalism 65
Maddy, Penelope
2000 Naturalism and the a priori, in New Essays on the A Priori, edited
by Boghossian, P. & Peacocke, C., Oxford: Clarendon Press,
92–116.
Neurath, Otto, Hahn, Hans & Carnap, Rudolf
1929 Wissenschaftlische Weltaufassung: der Wiener Kreis,
Veröffentlichungen des Vereines Ernst Mach, Wien: Arthur
Wolf Verlag, translated by O. Neurath as The Scientific Conception
of the World: The Vienna Circle, in R. S. Cohen and M. Neurath
(eds.) Empiricism and Sociology, Dordrecht: Reidel, 1973, 299–318.
Newton, Isaac
1726 The Principia: Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, Los
Angeles: University of California Press, translated by I. B. Cohen and
A. Whitman, 1999.
Poincaré Henri
1898 On the foundations of geometry, Monist, IX, 1–43.
1902 La Science et l’Hypothèse, Paris: Flammarion, translated by
W. J. Greenstreet as Science and Hypothesis, New York: Dover, 1952.
1905 La Valeur de la science, Paris: Flammarion, translated by
G.B.Halsted as The Value of Science, New York: Dover, 1958.
1913 Dernières pensées, Paris: Flammarion, translated by J. Bolduc as
Mathematics and Science: Last Essays, New York: Dover, 1963.
Quine, Willard van Orman
1961 From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, chap. Two Dogmas of Empiricism, 20–46.
Schlick, Moritz
1915 Die philosophische Bedeutung des Relativitätsprinzips, Zeitschrift
für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, 159, 129–175, translated
by P. Heath as “The Philosophical Significance of the Principle of
Relativity”, in H. L. Mulder and B. F.B Van de Velde-Schlick (eds.),
Moritz Schlick: Philosophical Papers, vol. 1, Dordrecht: D. Reidel
Publishing Company, 1979: 153–189.
Walter, Scott
2008 Hypothesis and convention in Poincaré’s defense of Galilei space-
time, in The Significance of the Hypothetical in the Natural Sciences,
edited by Heidelberger, M. & Schiemann, G., Berlin: De
Gruyter, 193–219.
66 Steven Bland
2010 L’hypothèse naturelle, ou quatre jours dans la vie de Gerhard
Heinzmann, in Construction: Festschrift for Gerhard Heinzmann,
edited by P.E. Bour, M. Rebuschi & Rollet, L., London:
College Publications, 129–135.
